British Imperialism and Decolonization:

A Chinese Perspective

　

(a reduced version)

　

(The full article was published in Gentlemanly Capitalism,

Imperialism and Global History, edited by Shigeru Akita)

　

Shunhong Zhang

 

 

　

    Historians of different opinions have showed great interest in P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins’s two volumes, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914, and British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990, since their publication  in 1993.  Many reviews with comments for and against Cain and Hopkins’s concept of  gentlemanly capitalism and interpretation of British imperialism have appeared. The most comprehensive response so far has been the collective work entitled Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism, which includes eight essays and a general introduction by the editor commenting on Cain and Hopkins’s arguments. This study work also includes an afterword by Cain and Hopkins themselves.[1] It seems that ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ is becoming a viable concept in the historical debate on British imperialism, despite the ambiguity surrounding its connotation. Cain and Hopkins’s books, however, have not yet attracted much attention from historians in China: as far as I know, no review has appeared in a Chinese-language publication.  In this chapter, I shall comment on Cain and Hopkins’s British Imperialism and elaborate some of my own ideas on British imperialism and decolonization.

　

What Does Decolonization Mean?

Decolonization is a widely used concept both inside and outside academic circles, but its meaning is still ambiguous and controversial. Some commentators use ‘decolonization’ to mean the process by which empires disintegrate and colonies achieve independence. Scholars in developing countries now often consider decolonization as a process of struggle for ending colonial rule. From this vantage point, decolonization means liberating colonies, whereas in the West it usually means granting independence. I take the view, here and in my other publications,  that the substance of decolonization is the actions of the colonial power, including all the strategies, tactics and measures used in the course of a forced imperial retreat, which were taken with the intention of maintaining its own interests.[2] This concept differs from that of Cain and Hopkins.

        Colonial powers were never willing to ‘decolonize’ (give independence to colonies); they only retreated from colonies because they were forced to do so by the national liberation movement and other forces that were opposed colonialism. The end of the British Empire was not determined by the will of Britain, though Britain did command a certain initiative in the course of the imperial retreat. To some extent, Britain could manage how and to whom power would be transferred. In this respect, British policy-makers showed a considerable degree of flexibility and also achieved a great deal of success. Various efforts were made to contain ‘radical’ nationalists, and power was transferred, wherever possible, to the more ‘moderate’ nationalists who showed more readiness to cooperate with the colonial power.

        Here is one example. In April 1953 Cheddi Jagan’s People’s Progressive Party won the general election in British Guiana under a new constitution. Jagan became Prime Minister, but because he supported some socialist principles he was considered to be ‘radical’ by the British Government. In October 1953, a state of emergency was declared and the constitution was suspended. Jagan and many other members of the People’s Progressive Party were put into jail. In December 1956, with certain revisions of the constitution, a new election was held. Jagan’s People’s Progressive Party again won the majority of the elected members. But the suspension of the constitution in 1953 helped to split the nationalists. The split later became a serious problem and led to social conflict. There was another election in August 1961. Once more, the People’s Progressive Party won a majority: 20 seats out of 35, with Burnham’s People’s National Congress getting 11 seats and D’Aguiar’s United Force getting 4. But the People’s Progressive Party gained only 42.6% of the total vote, while the People’s National Congress and the United Force gained 41% and 16.4% respectively. There were sharp differences between the People’s Progressive Party and the other two parties. The latter requested that a new election, based on proportional representation, should be held before independence. Burnham and D’Aguiar were considered to be moderate and less radical than Jagan. Thus independence was postponed. In 1964 the British government issued a new Order in Council revising British Guiana’s constitution. Proportional representation was adopted and a new election took place in December 1964. The People Progressive Party won 24 seats out of 53, while the People’s National Congress and the United Force got 22 and 7 seats respectively. The People’s Progressive Party did not win the majority and the other two parties refused to cooperate with it. Thus Burnham was asked by the Governor to form a government. In the end, the People’s Progressive Party was ‘out of power’ and British Guiana became independent in May 1966 with Burnham as the first Prime Minister of Guyana.[3] This story illustrates vividly that Britain did have an ability to direct the transfer of power in the course of her imperial retreat, and power was transferred preferably to the more moderate nationalists.

        The core of decolonization was the transfer of power and the transition of relations. In the course of the imperial retreat, Britain’s strategy was to establish new relations with the emergent or newly independent countries which could maintain the old relations as far as possible and thus ensure the continuity of British interests. Part of this strategy was to bring newly independent countries into the Commonwealth. This was a long term policy of British governments. As the Commonwealth Secretary put it in  September 1954: ‘However uncomfortable it may be to have some of the emergent territories as full Commonwealth partners, we are quite clear that the wiser course is to admit them to a status of nominal equality, and seek from the start to ensure that, through sharing in that intimate exchange of views and information on foreign policy which marks relations between Members of the Commonwealth, they will remain within our own sphere of influence … the existence of a Commonwealth composed of like-minded, independent and freely associating Members drawn from every continent, is a source of strength and prestige for the United Kingdom.’[4] In this way, the British government achieved great successes and most newly independent countries became members of the Commonwealth. As a result, British interests were largely secured and established relations largely maintained.

        Neocolonialism, which Cain and Hopkins admit, ‘can undoubtedly be found in parts of the former empire’ did indeed manifest itself in the course of the imperial retreat.[5] Decolonization can be considered as a transitional process from colonialism to neocolonialism. What constitutes neocolonialism is another topic on which my colleagues and I have recently published a book.[6]

        For a variety of reasons, the strength of nationalism was not equal in different colonial territories. The upsurge of the national liberation movement thus arrived earlier in one territory than in another. This is why some territories obtained independence before others. Generally speaking, wherever the national liberation movement was strong, the imperial retreat took place earlier than where it was weak. This explains why the major territories of South Asia became independent in the years immediately following World War II, whereas most colonies in Africa did not achieve independence until the 1960s.

        The colonial empires collapsed in the three decades following the Second World War. The British Empire was no exception. The fundamental reason for this was that, in the postwar period, there was an unprecedented upsurge of nationalism across the colonies and semi-colonies and also a high tide of the international communist movement, which was a strong force against colonialism. These developments led to a great change in the international power balance. All colonial powers, whether or not they had a ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ element which played a similar role to its British counterpart, had to ‘decolonize’. They all faced the same external pressures.

         In the last pages of their work, Cain and Hopkins make a brief observation about the implications of their analysis for the study of rival imperialist powers, especially those in Europe. But they do not take the matter further. They admit that they could not ‘decide whether the particular configuration of interests we have identified was both present and of equal importance elsewhere, or whether it was specific to the British case’. ‘The reason for the difficulty is simply that the evidence currently available is insufficiently detailed to allow generalizations to be made with confidence.’[7] This kind of elusive statement offers no help in understanding why all colonial empires collapsed so rapidly at the same time. Historians need to be aware that there must be some overwhelming force outside the metropolitan powers that pushed the empires to their end.

         Cain and Hopkins made only a partial investigation into ‘decolonization’. Many issues concerned with the postwar imperial retreat were not even touched. If we consider all the major issues as a whole, financial problems were only a part, perhaps only a small part, of the British government’s concerns. A basic strategy of Britain’s imperial retreat was to establish a new relationship with the newly independent countries, which would ensure, as far as possible, a continuation of the old relations. A major aim of this strategy was to keep the newly independent countries within the Commonwealth and within the ‘free world’ when the Cold War was at its height. To maintain financial relations so as to secure the interests of the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ was only a part of this strategy.

       When we look into the treaties and agreements signed between Britain and the emergent territories or newly independent countries in the course of the imperial retreat, we find that most of them were not concerned with financial issues.[8] A great number were related to military or strategic affairs; they were about the maintenance of British military bases and the status of British troops stationed in the territories concerned, or about British military assistance to the newly independent countries, for instance, providing military facilities and helping to train the armed forces of the countries concerned.[9]

       The other major group of agreements signed between Britain and the emergent territories at the time of independence concerned public service. Almost all the territories signed such agreements with Britain. The first one was the British---Ceylon Public Officers Agreement. This agreement was very short, only a few hundred words, but it contained the basic elements that later agreements also had.[10] These agreements usually had clear definitions about qualifications, conditions of service and retirement, and the preservation, payment and increase of pensions. There were also provisions on the release of public officers for employment elsewhere. These agreements ensured pensions for public officers who had worked in the colonies and who would continue to work in the newly independent countries. They tended to encourage public officers to stay in these countries. The chief purpose of these agreements was to ensure a stable transition of the established relations.

       There were indeed agreements of a financial nature. But they were mainly concerned with the sterling balances, signed mainly between Britain and South Asian territories: India, Pakistan and Ceylon. These agreements set the conditions whereby sterling balances held in London would be gradually released. The first financial agreement of this kind (between India and Britain) came into force on 31 August 1947 and terminated on 31 December 1947. The agreement was extended or replaced by new ones until the 1950s, when the problem of the sterling balances was finally resolved. Afterwards, there were few similar agreements signed between Britain and other emergent territories.

        If we look through the conclusions of postwar British Cabinet meetings, which are available in the Public Record Office (CAB 128), we will find that financial issues between Britain and the emergent territories were not often discussed in Cabinet meetings. Apart from the matter of the colonial sterling balances, only a few entries were directly linked with colonial financial issues. The following is one example. On 26 July 1960, in a meeting on overseas civil service, ‘there was general agreement in the Cabinet that in present circumstances high priority must be given to the maintenance of an efficient system of administration in Colonies advancing towards independence. In recent experience in Africa and in Asia there was ample evidence that without this, the structure of society in emergent countries could easily collapse. This could imply, not merely a failure of our Colonial Policy, but serious damage to our investment in those countries – which would impose a much more serious strain on our balance of payments.’[11]  The British government here showed a great concern with financial issues. Even so, this concern should not be considered to be solely in  the interests of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. Rather, it represented the whole of Britain’s economic interests.

         British governments did take into consideration the interests of British investments in colonies that were approaching independence. Again, however, this was only a part of governmental concerns. It can be seen from British Cabinet discussions of the colonies down to the late 1960s, that there were more entries on constitutional reform, colonial services, and the development of colonial resources and military affairs, such as emergencies and defence. Financial issues regarding the colonies were not frequently discussed in Cabinet meetings. Of course, many financial issues were dealt with at the departmental level, but this means that what was then discussed by the Cabinet was of some importance.

 

The Cain and Hopkins theme of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ has its limitations both in explaining the causes of imperialism and in presenting the whole picture of Britain’s imperial experience. Cain and Hopkins also distort imperialism, which is much whitewashed. In reading their work, one may often feel that imperialism was something good, something positive to world progress. The picture of imperialism illustrated by them is a partial one.  The numerous problems and evils caused by imperialism are ignored or rarely mentioned. This carries the danger of misleading readers who do not have a command of the real history of modern imperialism.

       The concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ invented by Cain and Hopkins is also misleading because of its ambiguity. Does ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ only mean the capitalism of gentlemen or also the capitalism that is gentle or gentleman-like? Reviewers have not yet discussed this problem and the work of Cain and Hopkins does not exclude such an interpretation.

        History is a form of science and should be based on historical facts - impartial and complete. In order to write a scientific and objective history it is necessary to consult research material as widely as possible. To do so, a historian needs to consult records kept in different languages. On topics relating to international affairs, it is particularly necessary to consult the literature of ‘both sides’.  Cain and Hopkins failed to consult original materials written in Eastern languages. The chapters on China do not make a use of original Chinese materials. It is perhaps unfair to criticize them on this score, for it would be impossible for any historian to consult original documents written in many different languages. In writing generally on a subject like imperialism, one needs to depend largely on secondary sources, as Cain and Hopkins did. However, imperialism concerned not only the colonial powers, but also the colonies and semi-colonies. It is therefore essential to consult materials produced by both sides in order to come to a fairer conclusion. Failing to do so, damages the strength of any theme, theory or argument derived from historical inquiry. Only when defects of this kind in the writings of Cain and Hopkins are recognised, does it become clear how fantastic is the idea that Britain’s ‘one China policy’ succeeded in holding China together, as Cain and Hopkins claim.[12] In historical reality it was a simple fact that Britain was a leading actor in the ‘scramble’ for China.

        The British Empire was the largest of the European colonial empires and was an integral and massive component of modern world history. In the centuries of its existence, it changed the world considerably. The destructive influence of British imperialism brought down established institutions in many societies, and replaced to the large extent with British institutions during the era of colonial rule. The pressure imposed by British imperialism forced societies concenred to respond. This in turn led to fundamental changes in these societies. Britain’s ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ certainly had a great impact on global history. The Empire ended, but it evolved into the Commonwealth, an international body now consisting of more than fifty countries across the world. Today there is no formal empire in the world, but Cain and Hopkins’s ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ is still there and it will continue to impose its influence upon global history.

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